We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full
incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic …

We propose a nonlinear difference-in-differences method to estimate multivariate
counterfactual distributions in classical treatment and control study designs with …

We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social choice function f from an
abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, ie implementable by a truthful …

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow
harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for single …

We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope
theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable …

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an
optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility …

This paper studies strategic interaction in networks. We focus on games of strategic
substitutes and strategic complements, and departing from previous literature, we do not …

We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (eg,
digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit …

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow
harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a …

We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms,
scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not quite qualify as one or the other …