Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of
coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand …

We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with
combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by …

We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian
framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers …

We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even
when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define …

The field of optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, as well
as several killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from …

In online combinatorial auctions m indivisible items are to be allocated to n agents who
arrive online. Agents have random valuations for the different subsets of items and the goal …

Over the past decade, an exciting connection has developed between the theory of posted-
price mechanisms and the prophet inequality, a result from the theory of optimal stop** …

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design,
paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper …