Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects
of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network …

This chapter studies the inefficiency of equilibria in noncooperative routing games, in which
selfinterested players route traffic through a congested network. Our goals are threefold: to …

We characterize the Price of Anarchy (POA) in weighted congestion games, as a function of
the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of …

Suppose that a set of weighted tasks shall be assigned to a set of machines with possibly
different speeds such that the load is distributed evenly among the machines. In computer …

We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for congestion games with
polynomial latency functions. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how …

We study congestion games where players aim to access a set of resources. Each player
has a set of possible strategies and each resource has a function associating the latency it …

We study the problem of scheduling permanent jobs on unrelated machines when the
objective is to minimize the Lp norm of the machine loads. The problem is known as load …

We consider broadcast network design games in undirected networks in which every player
is a node wishing to receive communication from a distinguished source node s and the cost …

We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with
unsplittable demands. In our setting, only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest …

We study the effect of combining selfishness and altruism in atomic congestion games. We
allow players to be partially altruistic and partially selfish and determine the impact of this …