Given a set of outcomes that affect the welfare of the members of a group, KJ Arrow imposed
the following five conditions on the ordering of the outcomes as a function of the preferences …

Publisher Summary This chapter presents a rich preference model tailored for database
systems. Preferences as strict partial orders have an intuitive semantics; they may be …

Within the framework of the axiomatic approach three types of voting schemes are
investigated according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are …

Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only
Pareto optimal alternatives at each profile of individual preferences? Using the framework of …

We consider social choice on a non-empty, finite set X where all elements of X are available;
society will not be required to make a choice from a strict subset of X. Arrow assumes that …

In the context of fixed agenda social choice correspondences, and by imposing usual
axioms, we prove that power is distributed among either a non-complete hierarchy of …

Pareto optimality (sometimes known as Pareto efficiency) is an important notion in social
sciences and related areas, see eg Klaus (2006), Chun (2005), Hild (2004), Kibris (2003) …

Voting operators map n-tuples of subsets of a given set X of candidates (the voters' choices)
into subsets of X (the social choice). This paper characterizes dictatorial voting operators by …

In this paper we propose a procedure to determine an individual preference aggregation.
The procedure is based on the concept of second order preferences. If the preference …

Contenido Contents Dr. José Felipe Villegas Elizondo Presidente Dr. Octavio Narváez P.
Vicepresidente Dr. Adrián Rendón Secretario Dr. Juan O. Galindo G. Tesorero NEUMOLOGÍA Y …