Matching, capturing allocation of items to unit-demand buyers, or tasks to workers, or pairs of
collaborators, is a central problem in economics. Indeed, the growing prevalence of …

Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of
coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand …

A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both
strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst …

We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with
combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by …

We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the maxmin share
paradigm introduced by Budish~\citeBudish: first as a measure for fairness.\procacciafirst …

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

In online combinatorial auctions m indivisible items are to be allocated to n agents who
arrive online. Agents have random valuations for the different subsets of items and the goal …

The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stop**
Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items …

We present a general framework for proving polynomial sample complexity bounds for the
problem of learning from samples the best auction in a class of “simple” auctions. Our …