This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of
what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those …

We develop an approach to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions. First,
we introduce a general auction model with asymmetric bidders. Second, we study the …

This paper presents new identification results for models of first–price, second–price,
ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We consider a general specification …

We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business
Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis …

In many procurement auctions, the bidders' unobserved costs depend both on a common
shock and on idiosyncratic private information. Assuming a multiplicative structure, I derive …

The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

Auction theory is of central importance in the study of markets. Unfortunately, we do not
know equilibrium bidding strategies for most auction games. For realistic markets with …

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from
1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but …

In view of the non-identification of the first-price auction model with risk-averse bidders, this
paper proposes some parametric identifying restrictions and a semiparametric estimator for …

Markets can give false impressions of liquidity and stability if failed attempts to trade are
ignored. For collateralized loan obligations, we quantify this bias by estimating the total cost …