The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation

E Anshelevich, A Dasgupta, J Kleinberg, É Tardos… - SIAM Journal on …, 2008 - SIAM
Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects
of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network …

Designing network protocols for good equilibria

HL Chen, T Roughgarden, G Valiant - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2010 - SIAM
Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users
interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a …

Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games

B Awerbuch, Y Azar, A Epstein, VS Mirrokni… - Proceedings of the 9th …, 2008 - dl.acm.org
We study the speed of convergence of decentralized dynamics to approximately optimal
solutions in potential games. We consider α-Nash dynamics in which a player makes a …

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games

R Gopalakrishnan, JR Marden… - Mathematics of …, 2014 - pubsonline.informs.org
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share “welfare”(cost or revenue)
among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee …

How bad is selfish voting?

S Brânzei, I Caragiannis, J Morgenstern… - Proceedings of the …, 2013 - ojs.aaai.org
It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore
ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the …

A game-theoretic approach for cost-effective multicast routing in the internet of things

S Kumar, A Goswami, R Gupta… - IEEE Internet of …, 2022 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Internet of Things (IoT) devices have enabled communications in resource-limited
computing environments. Sensor nodes from the multiple IoT devices collectively work for …

The curse of simultaneity

RP Leme, V Syrgkanis, É Tardos - Proceedings of the 3rd innovations in …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
Typical models of strategic interactions in computer science use simultaneous move games.
However, in applications simultaneity is often hard or impossible to achieve. In this paper …

Efficient computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

I Caragiannis, A Fanelli, N Gravin… - 2011 IEEE 52nd …, 2011 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or
even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete. We present a …

On the value of coordination in network design

S Albers - SIAM Journal on Computing, 2009 - SIAM
We study network design games where n self-interested agents have to form a network by
purchasing links from a given set of edges. We consider Shapley cost sharing mechanisms …

Near-optimal network design with selfish agents

E Anshelevich, A Dasgupta, É Tardos… - Theory of …, 2008 - theoryofcomputing.org
We introduce a simple network design game that models how independent selfish agents
can build or maintain a large network. In our game every agent has a specific connectivity …