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Understanding preferences:“demand types”, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities
An Equivalence Theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new
methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into “Demand …
methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into “Demand …
[PDF][PDF] Approximate combinatorial auctions with budgets
We develop sealed-bid combinatorial auction formats for indivisible goods in which bidders
can express budget constraints. To do so, we analyze the extent to which the designer must …
can express budget constraints. To do so, we analyze the extent to which the designer must …
Solving strong-substitutes product-mix auctions
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions: it finds
competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding …
competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding …
The Economics of Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods
This paper develops a theory of competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods based entirely
on economic conditions on demand. The key idea is to analyze complementarity and …
on economic conditions on demand. The key idea is to analyze complementarity and …
[PDF][PDF] Proof that the strong substitutes product-mix auction bidding language can represent any strong substitutes preferences
E Baldwin, P Klemperer - 2021 - elizabeth-baldwin.me.uk
Proof that the Strong Substitutes Product-Mix Auction Bidding Language can represent any
Strong Substitutes preferences Page 1 Proof that the Strong Substitutes Product-Mix Auction …
Strong Substitutes preferences Page 1 Proof that the Strong Substitutes Product-Mix Auction …
[PDF][PDF] Are Digital Monopolies Exploitative?
S Finster, P Goldberg, E Lock - 2024 - simonfinster.github.io
In markets with multiple divisible goods and budget-constrained buyers, competitive
equilibrium may not be efficient. We study the notion of constrained efficiency that, in the …
equilibrium may not be efficient. We study the notion of constrained efficiency that, in the …
[PDF][PDF] Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets
S Finster, P Goldberg, E Lock - 2024 - edwinlock.com
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the
utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple …
utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple …
Market Design for Matching and Auctions
R Jagadeesan - 2020 - dash.harvard.edu
Models of matching with contracts can elegantly capture the discreteness and heterogeneity
of interactions that arise in many real-world markets. However, the indivisibility of contracts …
of interactions that arise in many real-world markets. However, the indivisibility of contracts …