When aggregating the preferences of multiple agents into one collective choice, it is easily
seen that certain cases call for randomization or other means of tiebreaking. For example, if …

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in
efficiency--typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the …

Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating
individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most …

We consider the following well-studied problem of metric distortion in social choice.
Suppose that we have an election with n voters and m candidates located in a shared metric …

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public
goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen …

The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded
in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting …

We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, V and C,
that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in C whose total distance …

We determine the quality of randomized social choice algorithms in a setting in which the
agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs …

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on
rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal …