We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

The Competition Complexity of an auction setting refers to the number of additional bidders
necessary in order for the (deterministic, prior-independent, dominant strategy truthful) …

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg [in Proceedings of the …

Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular,
the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and …

We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility
models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent …

We consider a principal seller with $ m $ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer
over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but …

Consider a seller with m heterogeneous items for sale to a single additive buyer whose
values for the items are arbitrarily correlated. It was previously shown that, in such settings …

The enhanced competition paradigm is an attempt at bridging the gap between simple and
optimal auctions. In this line of work, given an auction setting with m items and n bidders, the …

We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a
revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to n buyers with independent private values. In …

Algorithmic mechanism design is an interdisciplinary field, concerned with the design of
algorithms that are used by strategic agents. This field has applications in many real-world …