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Auction theory: A guide to the literature
P Klemperer - Journal of economic surveys, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing
and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.(The most important of these are …
and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.(The most important of these are …
Auctions: theory and practice
P Klemperer - 2018 - torrossa.com
February 2000 was a stressful month for me: the UK 3G auction was about to begin. For over
two years I had been working with the UK government to design the world's first auction of …
two years I had been working with the UK government to design the world's first auction of …
Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions
Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity
auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for …
auctions are examples. In multi-unit auctions, bids for marginal units may affect payments for …
An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects
LM Ausubel - American Economic Review, 2004 - aeaweb.org
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous …
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous …
Composable and efficient mechanisms
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even
when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define …
when players participate in multiple mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define …
Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
S Bikhchandani, JW Mamer - Journal of economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
We analyze an exchange economy in which (i) all commodities except money are
indivisible,(ii) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle …
indivisible,(ii) agents' preferences can be described by a reservation value for each bundle …
Bayesian mechanism design
JD Hartline - … and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science, 2013 - nowpublishers.com
Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …
The package assignment model
S Bikhchandani, JM Ostroy - Journal of Economic theory, 2002 - Elsevier
We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several,
rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient …
rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient …
An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process
We consider a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine
which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of nonprice …
which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of nonprice …
The price of anarchy in auctions
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …