Policy learning for continuous space security games using neural networks

N Kamra, U Gupta, F Fang, Y Liu… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2018 - ojs.aaai.org
A wealth of algorithms centered around (integer) linear programming have been proposed
to compute equilibrium strategies in security games with discrete states and actions …

Converging to team-maxmin equilibria in zero-sum multiplayer games

Y Zhang, B An - International Conference on Machine …, 2020 - proceedings.mlr.press
Efficiently computing equilibria for multiplayer games is still an open challenge in
computational game theory. This paper focuses on computing Team-Maxmin Equilibria …

Optimal interdiction of urban criminals with the aid of real-time information

Y Zhang, Q Guo, B An, L Tran-Thanh… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2019 - aaai.org
Most violent crimes happen in urban and suburban cities. With emerging tracking
techniques, law enforcement officers can have real-time location information of the esca** …

Strategic coordination of human patrollers and mobile sensors with signaling for security games

H Xu, K Wang, P Vayanos, M Tambe - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2018 - ojs.aaai.org
Traditional security games concern the optimal randomized allocation of human patrollers,
who can directly catch attackers or interdict attacks. Motivated by the emerging application of …

DeepFP for finding Nash equilibrium in continuous action spaces

N Kamra, U Gupta, K Wang, F Fang, Y Liu… - Decision and Game …, 2019 - Springer
Finding Nash equilibrium in continuous action spaces is a challenging problem and has
applications in domains such as protecting geographic areas from potential attackers. We …

[PDF][PDF] Computing optimal ex ante correlated equilibria in two-player sequential games

A Celli, S Coniglio, N Gatti - Proceedings of the 18th …, 2019 - aamas.csc.liv.ac.uk
The computational study of adversarial interactions aiming at finding players' optimal
strategies and predicting the most likely outcome of a game is a central problem in Artificial …

On the inducibility of stackelberg equilibrium for security games

Q Guo, J Gan, F Fang, L Tran-Thanh, M Tambe… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2019 - aaai.org
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg
security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes …

CFR-MIX: Solving imperfect information extensive-form games with combinatorial action space

S Li, Y Zhang, X Wang, W Xue, B An - arxiv preprint arxiv:2105.08440, 2021 - arxiv.org
In many real-world scenarios, a team of agents coordinate with each other to compete
against an opponent. The challenge of solving this type of game is that the team's joint …

Iterative algorithms for solving one-sided partially observable stochastic shortest path games

P Tomášek, K Horák, B Bošanský - International Journal of Approximate …, 2024 - Elsevier
Real-world scenarios often involve dynamic interactions among competing agents, where
decisions are made considering actions taken by others. These situations can be modeled …

Solving Urban Network Security Games: Learning Platform, Benchmark, and Challenge for AI Research

S Zhuang, S Li, T Yang, M Li, X Shi, B An… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2025 - arxiv.org
After the great achievement of solving two-player zero-sum games, more and more AI
researchers focus on solving multiplayer games. To facilitate the development of designing …