This book provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the
strategic behavior in queues. The author presents the material in an easy style with mostly …

It is well known that in a network with arbitrary (convex) latency functions that are a function
of edge traffic, the worst-case ratio, over all inputs, of the system delay caused due to selfish …

In this paper, we study the price of anarchy of traffic routing, under the assumption that users
are partially altruistic or spiteful. We model such behavior by positing that the" cost" …

We present three new coordination mechanisms for scheduling n selfish jobs on m
unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of …

This article studies the effects of altruism, a phenomenon widely observed in practice, in the
model of atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a linear trade-off …

We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with
unsplittable demands. In our setting, only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest …

We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well
established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load …

We investigate the impact of Stackelberg routing to reduce the price of anarchy in network
routing games. In this setting, an α fraction of the entire demand is first routed centrally …

In this paper, we consider repeated routing games with piecewise-constant congestion
taxing in which a central planner sets and announces the congestion taxes for fixed …

We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social
welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the …