This chapter surveys the literature on behavioral industrial organization, covering four broad
topics:(1) how rational firms interact with consumers who make systematic mistakes in …

This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of
what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those …

February 2000 was a stressful month for me: the UK 3G auction was about to begin. For over
two years I had been working with the UK government to design the world's first auction of …

Abstract Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems
undermine attempts b firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential …

This paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste
differences. Consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger …

This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has
private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint …

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented,
and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact
communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers …

Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally
considered" regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct …

Detecting cartels Page 1 Harrington, Joseph E. Working Paper Detecting cartels Working Paper,
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …