We show that a random rule on a top-connected single-peaked domain is unanimous and
strategy-proof if and only if it is a random min–max rule. As a by-product of this result, it …

This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker
notions of truth-telling. It models individual i's honesty standard as a profile of (possibly non …

We study Nash implementation under complete information with the distinctive feature that
the planner knows neither individuals' state-contingent preferences (payoff states) nor how …

We consider social choice problems where the admissible set of preferences of each agent
is single-peaked. First, we show that if all the agents have the same admissible set of …

A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim,“Do not lie if you do not have
to”, to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that …

We consider domains in strategic voting problems which satisfy three properties, namely top-
connectedness, pervasiveness, and richness. We prove the following two results for such a …

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in
strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break …

We study Nash implementation by natural price–quantity mechanisms in pure exchange
economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an …

We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemological
perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest …

We show that a large class of restricted domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing,
single-dipped, tree-single-peaked with top-set along a path, Euclidean, multi-peaked …