We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009)[15] to N-player games with arbitrary
information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under …

I consider repeated games on a network where players interact and communicate with their
neighbors. At each stage, players choose actions and exchange private messages with their …

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games
where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff …

The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage game is
repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff …

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Page 1 Repeated Games with Incomplete
Information Jérôme Renault Toulouse School of Economics, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole …

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct
nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is …

This paper studies reliability and security of information transmission in networks. We
consider the framework of Franklin and Wright (J. Cryptol. 13 (1): 9–30, 2000): multicast …

We consider repeated game forms with incomplete information and state dependent
signalling structure. We study the information a player can learn about the state of nature …

This paper investigates how rational agents make decisions in networks with incomplete
information about the overall network structure. Using an infinitely repeated local interaction …

We consider sender–receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant
nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of …