We review the recent theoretical and empirical literature on debt covenants with a particular
focus on how creditor governance after covenant violations can influence the borrower's …

This paper extends the work of Balachandran and Faff (2015) and reviews the literature on
effective governance, financial markets, institutions, and crises. Specifically, we discuss the …

This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects
corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm …

We show that the presence of dual holders following the mergers between institutional
shareholders and creditors of industry firms leads to a decrease in the firms' excessive …

This paper shows evidence of a positive relationship between institutional dual holders, who
hold both equity and debt in a firm, and voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG) emission …

Dual holders, financial institutions that simultaneously hold the debt and equity claims of the
same firms, increase corporate tax avoidance. The positive effect is more pronounced in …

We investigate the influence of simultaneous equity holdings by creditors (dual holders) on
investment efficiency. Such creditors have stronger incentives and power to monitor firm …

This paper analyzes the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on corporate risk-taking.
Specifically, I examine the role played by institutional dual-holders (ie, those simultaneously …

This paper examines how strengthened creditor protection affects the real economy in view
of labor investment efficiency. Exploiting the implementation of the enterprise bankruptcy law …

We investigate the effect of agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders on
aggressive tax avoidance using a unique setting of dual holders who simultaneously hold …