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Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence
Auctions are inherently risky: bidders face uncertainty about their prospects of winning and
payments, while sellers are unsure about revenue and chances of a successful sale. Auction …
payments, while sellers are unsure about revenue and chances of a successful sale. Auction …
On Robustness to -Wise Independence of Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms
This paper reexamines the classic problem of revenue maximization in single-item auctions
with n buyers under the lens of the robust optimization framework. The celebrated Myerson's …
with n buyers under the lens of the robust optimization framework. The celebrated Myerson's …
Optimal and efficient auctions for the gradual procurement of strategic service provider agents
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services
from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict …
from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict …
Simple mechanisms for non-linear agents
We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility
models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent …
models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent …
Revelation gap for pricing from samples
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is
designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a …
designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a …
Optimal pricing for MHR and λ-regular distributions
We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …
q-partitioning valuations: Exploring the space between subadditive and fractionally subadditive valuations
For a set $ M $ of $ m $ elements, we define a decreasing chain of classes of normalized
monotone-increasing valuation functions from $2^ M $ to $\mathbb {R} _ {\geq 0} …
monotone-increasing valuation functions from $2^ M $ to $\mathbb {R} _ {\geq 0} …
Buy-many mechanisms for many unit-demand buyers
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-
revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this …
revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this …
Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …
Optimal revenue guarantees for pricing in large markets
Posted price mechanisms (PPM) constitute one of the predominant practices to price goods
in online marketplaces and their revenue guarantees have been a central object of study in …
in online marketplaces and their revenue guarantees have been a central object of study in …