Social'and'Economic' Networks' Page 1 Social'and'Economic' Networks' ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Matthew O.
Jackson Copyright: Matthew O. Jackson 2014 Please do not post or distribute without …

Game theory is a field that studies interactive decisions. On the one hand, it builds models
that represent situations where several entities or players make choices, and where this …

This paper studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring, where players observe …

Ethnic groups are thought to be particularly good at enforcing cooperative behavior, in part
because social networks among coethnics are favorable to peer sanctioning schemes …

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random
matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no …

We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated
matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a …

Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring Page 1 MATHEMATICS OF
OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 32, No. 2, May 2007, pp. 413–424 ISSN 0364-765XEISSN …

I survey models of cooperation in large populations. Topics include repeated games with
public monitoring, random matching games, games on networks, infinitepopulation games …

A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that
behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that …

This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two‐action games with
local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a …