We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …

We investigate brokerage between traders from an online learning perspective. At any round
$ t $, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price …

A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It
is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism …

In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs.
Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over …

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can
exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as …

We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource
augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the (1-ε)-competition complexity of different types of …

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a
buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. The seminal result of Myerson and Satterthwaite …

We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on
a setting with n heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller i, and …

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied
to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and …