A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a
privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single‐crossing …

We study the design of informational environments in settings where generating information
is costly. We assume that the cost of a signal is proportional to the expected reduction in …

In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment …

Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the
decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to …

Information structure design, also sometimes known as signaling or persuasion, is
concerned with understanding the effects of information on the outcomes of strategic …

We revisit the celebrated Bayesian persuasion setting and examine how well the Sender
can perform when ignorant of the Receiver's utility. Taking an adversarial approach, we …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the
expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent
information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender …