Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world

S Balseiro, Y Deng, J Mao… - Advances in Neural …, 2021 - proceedings.neurips.cc
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …

Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world

Y Deng, J Mao, V Mirrokni, S Zuo - Proceedings of the Web Conference …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in
which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of …

Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep GSP auctions for e-commerce advertising

Z Zhang, X Liu, Z Zheng, C Zhang, M Xu, J Pan… - Proceedings of the 14th …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize
different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform …

On designing a two-stage auction for online advertising

Y Wang, X Liu, Z Zheng, Z Zhang, M Xu, C Yu… - Proceedings of the ACM …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
For the scalability of industrial online advertising systems, a two-stage auction architecture is
widely used to enable efficient ad allocation on a large set of corpus within a limited …

Bidding in Uniform Price Auctions for Value Maximizing Buyers

N Golrezaei, S Sahoo - arxiv preprint arxiv:2406.03674, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study the problem of bidding in uniform price auctions widely used in practice. Although
these auctions are non-truthful for bidders with quasilinear utility functions, several empirical …

Mechanism design under approximate incentive compatibility

SR Balseiro, O Besbes, F Castro - Operations Research, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect
optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or …

Robust pricing in dynamic mechanism design

Y Deng, S Lahaie, V Mirrokni - International Conference on …, 2020 - proceedings.mlr.press
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated
auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful …

Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising

R Zhu, Y Liu, D Chen, Z Ma, C Shi, Z Zheng… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for the internet industry, with ad
auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives …

Automated bidding vs manual bidding strategies in search engine marketing: a keyword efficiency perspective

P Jiang - Journal of Marketing Analytics, 2023 - Springer
We utilize data envelopment analysis to evaluate and compare the pricing efficiency of
keywords in the Google-sponsored search markets, specifically in relation to manual bidding …

Price manipulability in first-price auctions

J Brustle, P Dütting, B Sivan - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some,
like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non …