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Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …
the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve …
Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in
which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of …
which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of …
Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep GSP auctions for e-commerce advertising
In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize
different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform …
different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform …
On designing a two-stage auction for online advertising
For the scalability of industrial online advertising systems, a two-stage auction architecture is
widely used to enable efficient ad allocation on a large set of corpus within a limited …
widely used to enable efficient ad allocation on a large set of corpus within a limited …
Bidding in Uniform Price Auctions for Value Maximizing Buyers
We study the problem of bidding in uniform price auctions widely used in practice. Although
these auctions are non-truthful for bidders with quasilinear utility functions, several empirical …
these auctions are non-truthful for bidders with quasilinear utility functions, several empirical …
Mechanism design under approximate incentive compatibility
A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect
optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or …
optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or …
Robust pricing in dynamic mechanism design
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated
auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful …
auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful …
Contextual Generative Auction with Permutation-level Externalities for Online Advertising
Online advertising has become a core revenue driver for the internet industry, with ad
auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives …
auctions playing a crucial role in ensuring platform revenue and advertiser incentives …
Automated bidding vs manual bidding strategies in search engine marketing: a keyword efficiency perspective
P Jiang - Journal of Marketing Analytics, 2023 - Springer
We utilize data envelopment analysis to evaluate and compare the pricing efficiency of
keywords in the Google-sponsored search markets, specifically in relation to manual bidding …
keywords in the Google-sponsored search markets, specifically in relation to manual bidding …
Price manipulability in first-price auctions
First-price auctions have many desirable properties, including uniquely possessing some,
like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non …
like credibility. However, first-price auctions are also inherently non-truthful, and non …