[PDF][PDF] Group Fairness in Set Packing Problems.
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) typically seek to match incompatible patient-donor pairs
based on a utilitarian objective where the number or overall quality of transplants is …
based on a utilitarian objective where the number or overall quality of transplants is …
Adaptation, comparison and practical implementation of fairness schemes in kidney exchange programs
In Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), each participating patient is registered together with
an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then …
an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then …
A branch-and-price algorithm enhanced by decision diagrams for the kidney exchange problem
Problem definition: Kidney paired donation programs allow patients registered with an
incompatible donor to receive a suitable kidney from another donor, as long as the latter's co …
incompatible donor to receive a suitable kidney from another donor, as long as the latter's co …
[PDF][PDF] Individual fairness under group fairness constraints in bipartite matching-one framework to approximate them all
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and
individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference …
individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference …
Learning to Build Solutions in Stochastic Matching Problems Using Flows (Student Abstract)
Generative Flow Networks, known as GFlowNets, have been introduced in recent times,
presenting an exciting possibility for neural networks to model distributions across various …
presenting an exciting possibility for neural networks to model distributions across various …
Fair integer programming under dichotomous preferences
One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the
selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose …
selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose …
Barter Exchange with Shared Item Valuations
In barter exchanges agents enter seeking to swap their items for other items on their wishlist.
We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item …
We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item …
Penalties and Rewards for Fair Learning in Paired Kidney Exchange Programs
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed
as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic …
as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic …
[HTML][HTML] Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) increase kidney transplantation by facilitating the
exchange of incompatible donors. Increasing the scale of KEPs leads to more opportunities …
exchange of incompatible donors. Increasing the scale of KEPs leads to more opportunities …
Fair Resource Allocation in Weakly Coupled Markov Decision Processes
We consider fair resource allocation in sequential decision-making environments modeled
as weakly coupled Markov decision processes, where resource constraints couple the …
as weakly coupled Markov decision processes, where resource constraints couple the …