[PDF][PDF] Group Fairness in Set Packing Problems.

S Duppala, J Luque, JP Dickerson, A Srinivasan - IJCAI, 2023 - cs.umd.edu
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) typically seek to match incompatible patient-donor pairs
based on a utilitarian objective where the number or overall quality of transplants is …

Adaptation, comparison and practical implementation of fairness schemes in kidney exchange programs

W St-Arnaud, M Carvalho, G Farnadi - arxiv preprint arxiv:2207.00241, 2022 - arxiv.org
In Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), each participating patient is registered together with
an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then …

A branch-and-price algorithm enhanced by decision diagrams for the kidney exchange problem

LC Riascos-Álvarez, M Bodur… - … & Service Operations …, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
Problem definition: Kidney paired donation programs allow patients registered with an
incompatible donor to receive a suitable kidney from another donor, as long as the latter's co …

[PDF][PDF] Individual fairness under group fairness constraints in bipartite matching-one framework to approximate them all

A Panda, A Louis, P Nimbhorkar - … of the Thirty-Third International Joint …, 2024 - ijcai.org
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and
individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference …

Learning to Build Solutions in Stochastic Matching Problems Using Flows (Student Abstract)

W St-Arnaud, M Carvalho, G Farnadi - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2024 - ojs.aaai.org
Generative Flow Networks, known as GFlowNets, have been introduced in recent times,
presenting an exciting possibility for neural networks to model distributions across various …

Fair integer programming under dichotomous preferences

T Demeulemeester, D Goossens, B Hermans… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2023 - arxiv.org
One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the
selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose …

Barter Exchange with Shared Item Valuations

J Luque, S Duppala, J Dickerson… - Proceedings of the ACM …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
In barter exchanges agents enter seeking to swap their items for other items on their wishlist.
We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item …

Penalties and Rewards for Fair Learning in Paired Kidney Exchange Programs

M Carvalho, A Caulfield, Y Lin, A Vetta - International Conference on Web …, 2023 - Springer
A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed
as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic …

[HTML][HTML] Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange

D Blom, B Smeulders, F Spieksma - Games and Economic Behavior, 2024 - Elsevier
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) increase kidney transplantation by facilitating the
exchange of incompatible donors. Increasing the scale of KEPs leads to more opportunities …

Fair Resource Allocation in Weakly Coupled Markov Decision Processes

X Tu, Y Adulyasak, N Akbarzadeh, E Delage - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
We consider fair resource allocation in sequential decision-making environments modeled
as weakly coupled Markov decision processes, where resource constraints couple the …