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Proportionality and strategyproofness in multiwinner elections
D Peters - arxiv preprint arxiv:2104.08594, 2021 - arxiv.org
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of
candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or …
candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or …
Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion.
We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality …
We argue that rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality …
Simulating collective decision-making for autonomous vehicles coordination enabled by vehicular networks: A computational social choice perspective
Abstract Recent advancements in Intelligent Transportation Systems have endowed
vehicles with autonomous driving capabilities as well as V2X communication. Vehicular …
vehicles with autonomous driving capabilities as well as V2X communication. Vehicular …
[PDF][PDF] Approval-Based Multi-Winner Rules and Strategic Voting.
We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In
particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of …
particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of …
[PDF][PDF] Parameterized complexity of winner determination in minimax committee elections
H Liu, J Guo - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on …, 2016 - ifaamas.org
Recently, the winner determination problem of minimax ap-proval committee (or referenda)
elections has been extensively studied. In particular, Misra et al.[AAMAS 2015] investigated …
elections has been extensively studied. In particular, Misra et al.[AAMAS 2015] investigated …
Fair Division of the Commons
D Peters - 2019 - ora.ox.ac.uk
A group of agents controls a common budget or owns some common resources. The agents
need to decide how to divide this budget across various projects, or to distribute the …
need to decide how to divide this budget across various projects, or to distribute the …
[PDF][PDF] Parameterized complexity of committee elections with dichotomous and trichotomous votes
A Zhou, Y Yang, J Guo - … of the 18th International Conference on …, 2019 - ifaamas.org
The problem of aggregating the preferences of different agents (voters) occurs in diverse
situations and plays a fundamental role in artificial intelligence and social choice [10, 17] …
situations and plays a fundamental role in artificial intelligence and social choice [10, 17] …
Conditional and sequential approval voting on combinatorial domains
Several methods exist for making collective decisions on a set of variables when voters
possibly have preferential dependencies. None is based on approval voting. We define a …
possibly have preferential dependencies. None is based on approval voting. We define a …
Optimization-based voting rule design: The closer to utopia the better
In certain situations, such as elections in a Euclidean domain, it is possible to specify clear
requirements for the operation of a multiwinner voting rule, for it to provide committees that …
requirements for the operation of a multiwinner voting rule, for it to provide committees that …
Minisum and minimax committee election rules for general preference types
D Baumeister, T Böhnlein, L Rey, O Schaudt… - ECAI 2016, 2016 - ebooks.iospress.nl
In committee elections it is often assumed that voters only (dis) approve of each candidate or
that they rank all candidates, as it is common for single-winner elections. We suggest an …
that they rank all candidates, as it is common for single-winner elections. We suggest an …