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V-Learning--A Simple, Efficient, Decentralized Algorithm for Multiagent RL
A major challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) is the curse of multiagents,
where the size of the joint action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. This …
where the size of the joint action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. This …
When can we learn general-sum Markov games with a large number of players sample-efficiently?
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
A survey of decision making in adversarial games
In many practical applications, such as poker, chess, drug interdiction, cybersecurity, and
national defense, players often have adversarial stances, ie, the selfish actions of each …
national defense, players often have adversarial stances, ie, the selfish actions of each …
The power of exploiter: Provable multi-agent rl in large state spaces
Modern reinforcement learning (RL) commonly engages practical problems with large state
spaces, where function approximation must be deployed to approximate either the value …
spaces, where function approximation must be deployed to approximate either the value …
Breaking the traditional: a survey of algorithmic mechanism design applied to economic and complex environments
Q Chen, X Wang, ZL Jiang, Y Wu, H Li, L Cui… - Neural Computing and …, 2023 - Springer
The mechanism design theory can be applied not only in the economy but also in many
fields, such as politics and military affairs, which has important practical and strategic …
fields, such as politics and military affairs, which has important practical and strategic …
Sequential information design: Learning to persuade in the dark
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …
Computing optimal equilibria and mechanisms via learning in zero-sum extensive-form games
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It
applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design …
applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design …
Dream: Deep regret minimization with advantage baselines and model-free learning
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies
in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash …
in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash …
Near-optimal learning of extensive-form games with imperfect information
This paper resolves the open question of designing near-optimal algorithms for learning
imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line …
imperfect-information extensive-form games from bandit feedback. We present the first line …
Polynomial-time linear-swap regret minimization in imperfect-information sequential games
No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through
the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they …
the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they …