By downplaying externalities, magnifying the cost of moral behavior, or suggesting not being
pivotal, exculpatory narratives can allow individuals to maintain a positive image when in …

This paper develops a model of demand, pricing and advertising in the presence of social
learning via word-of-mouth communication between friends. In the model consumers must …

Models of signaling, adverse selection, and moral hazard make it clear that differences in
information can lead to inefficiency. Workers may invest in nonproductive education to …

We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its
implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state determines …

We study the production and circulation of arguments justifying actions on the basis of
morality. By downplaying externalities, exculpatory narratives allow people to maintain a …

We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our model, boundedly
rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neighbors' expressed opinions, but …

In this chapter we provide an interpretive survey of recent work on endogenous information
structures, where the information that is obtained by agents–who knows what–is determined …

This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed
principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' …

We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We
employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the …

This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the
mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria …