Coevolutionary games—a mini review

M Perc, A Szolnoki - BioSystems, 2010 - Elsevier
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts
with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is …

Evolutionary games on graphs

G Szabó, G Fath - Physics reports, 2007 - Elsevier
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to
behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the …

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity

L Schmid, K Chatterjee, C Hilbe, MA Nowak - Nature Human Behaviour, 2021 - nature.com
Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct
reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate …

Imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social networks

F Fu, DI Rosenbloom, L Wang… - Proceedings of the …, 2011 - royalsocietypublishing.org
The problem of achieving widespread immunity to infectious diseases by voluntary
vaccination is often presented as a public-goods dilemma, as an individual's vaccination …

Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation

A Traulsen, MA Nowak, JM Pacheco - … E—Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter …, 2006 - APS
We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary
process, which we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi …

Human strategy updating in evolutionary games

A Traulsen, D Semmann, RD Sommerfeld… - Proceedings of the …, 2010 - pnas.org
Evolutionary game dynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but
also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It …

Evolution of norms for judging social behavior

TA Kessinger, CE Tarnita, JB Plotkin - Proceedings of the National …, 2023 - pnas.org
Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate
with those of good social standing. But how should someone's reputation be updated as we …

The when and who of social learning and conformist transmission

M Muthukrishna, TJH Morgan, J Henrich - Evolution and Human Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
Formal evolutionary models predict when individuals rely on social learning over individual
learning and the relative strength of their conformist social learning biases. Here we use …

Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment

M Archetti, I Scheuring - Journal of theoretical biology, 2012 - Elsevier
We review the theory of public goods in biology. In the N-person prisoner's dilemma, where
the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions, cooperation requires some …

Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N-person stag hunt dilemmas

JM Pacheco, FC Santos… - Proceedings of the …, 2009 - royalsocietypublishing.org
In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation
of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than …