Contests with Multi‐tasking

DJ Clark, KA Konrad - Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well
understood and documented. Multi‐dimension extensions are possible but are liable to …

Strategic shirking in promotion tournaments

J DeVaro, O Gürtler - The Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2016 - academic.oup.com
We provide a theoretical analysis of multitask promotion tournaments in which workers
increase their promotion chances by under-performing (over-performing) on tasks that are …

[PDF][PDF] Enforcement leverage with fixed inspection capacity

L Liu, W Neilson - Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2013 - Citeseer
We expand the optimal targeting enforcement literature to allow regulator inspection
capacity constraints. A fixed number of firms are selected for inspection and those with the …

Competition for development: An analysis of the incentive mechanism of local governments' multi-dimensional competition.

S Yan - China Population Resources & Environment, 2020 - search.ebscohost.com
Local government competition plays an extremely central role in the process of China's
economic development from quantity growth to quality improvement. From the one-task …

Business commonality, standardization and product cycles

T Tsoulouhas - The Journal of International Trade & Economic …, 2022 - Taylor & Francis
By analyzing production with a continuum of tasks subject to common stochastic effects, the
analysis shows that tension between business commonality and standardization is an …

[KSIĄŻKA][B] Verhaltenssteuerung durch Anreize im Dienstleistungscontrolling

P Stebel - 2007 - Springer
Die vorliegende Dissertation entstand während meiner Zeit als externer Doktorand am
Seminar für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre und Controlling an der Universität zu Köln …

Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes

A D'Amato, L Franckx - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2010 - Springer
The subject of our paper is the regulation of nonpoint pollution targeted on emissions
proxies. We consider n risk-averse sources controlling multiple pollutants, and develop a …

[PDF][PDF] Relative performance evaluation between multitask agents

H Matsushima - 2006 - cirje.eu-tokyo.ac.jp
We investigate the moral hazard problem in which the principal delegates multiple tasks to
two agents. She imperfectly monitors the action choices by observing the public signals that …

Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?

AI Czerny, M Fosgerau, PJ Jost… - Journal of Economic …, 2019 - Elsevier
Consider a principal who assigns a job with two tasks to two identical agents. Monitoring the
agents' efforts is costly. Therefore the principal rewards the agents based on their (noisy) …

Role of relative and absolute performance evaluations in intergroup competition

H Matsushima - The Japanese Economic Review, 2010 - Springer
We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to
multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the …