In early 2018, Meltdown first showed how to read arbitrary kernel memory from user space
by exploiting side-effects from transient instructions. While this attack has been mitigated …

Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space Page 1 46 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM | JUNE 2020 | VOL. 63 | NO. 6 contributed articles IMA GE B Y ANDRIJ BOR YS A …

Research on transient execution attacks including Spectre and Meltdown showed that
exception or branch misprediction events might leave secret-dependent traces in the CPU's …

Power side-channel attacks exploit variations in power consumption to extract secrets from a
device, eg, cryptographic keys. Prior attacks typically required physical access to the target …

Meltdown and Spectre enable arbitrary data leakage from memory via various side
channels. Short-term software mitigations for Meltdown are only a temporary solution with a …

The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, eg, kernel
address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this …

To stop side channel attacks on CPU caches that have allowed attackers to leak secret
information and break basic security mechanisms, the security community has developed a …

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating
system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor …

Privacy protection is an essential part of information security. The use of shared resources
demands more privacy and security protection, especially in cloud computing environments …

Cache side-channel attacks can be leveraged as a building block in attacks leaking secrets
even in the absence of software bugs. Currently, there are no practical and generic …