The steep cost of capture

M Whittaker - Interactions, 2021 - dl.acm.org
FEATURE position. This threatens to deprive frontline communities, policymakers, and the
public of vital knowledge about the costs and consequences of AI and the industry …

Ballot-marking devices cannot ensure the will of the voters

AW Appel, RA DeMillo, PB Stark - Election Law Journal: Rules …, 2020 - liebertpub.com
The complexity of US elections usually requires computers to count ballots—but computers
can be hacked, so election integrity requires a voting system in which paper ballots can be …

Sets of half-average nulls generate risk-limiting audits: SHANGRLA

PB Stark - Financial Cryptography and Data Security: FC 2020 …, 2020 - Springer
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced to testing sets of
null hypotheses of the form “the average of this list is not greater than 1/2” for a collection of …

E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online Voting

LH Merino, A Azhir, H Zhang… - … IEEE Symposium on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Online voting is attractive for convenience and accessibility, but is more susceptible to voter
coercion and vote buying than in-person voting. One mitigation is to give voters fake voting …

" Why wouldn't someone think of democracy as a target?": Security practices & challenges of people involved with {US}. political campaigns

S Consolvo, PG Kelley, T Matthews, K Thomas… - 30th USENIX Security …, 2021 - usenix.org
People who are involved with political campaigns face increased digital security threats from
well-funded, sophisticated attackers, especially nation-states. Improving political campaign …

Voter verification of ballot marking device ballots is a two-part question: Can they? Mostly, they can. Do they? Mostly, they don't

P Kortum, MD Byrne, J Whitmore - Election Law Journal: Rules …, 2021 - liebertpub.com
The question of whether or not voters actually verify ballots produced by ballot marking
devices (BMDs) is presently the subject of some controversy. Recent studies (eg, Bernhard …

Security analysis of the democracy live online voting system

M Specter, JA Halderman - 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX …, 2021 - usenix.org
Democracy Live's OmniBallot platform is a web-based system for blank ballot delivery, ballot
marking, and online voting. Three states—Delaware, West Virginia, and New Jersey …

Verifiable and Private Vote-by-Mail

H Devillez, O Pereira, T Peters - Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024 - eprint.iacr.org
Vote-by-mail is increasingly used in Europe and worldwide for government elections.
Nevertheless, very few attempts have been made towards the design of verifiable vote-by …

Investigating voter perceptions of printed physical audit trails for online voting

K Marky, N Gerber, HJ Krumb, M Khamis… - … IEEE Symposium on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Online elections come with security challenges since digital votes do not produce physical
audit trails that are easily verifiable. We present and investigate a hybrid online voting …

Evidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trial, Then Audit

AW Appel, PB Stark - Geo. L. Tech. Rev., 2019 - HeinOnline
There is no perfect, infallible way to count votes. All methods including optical scan,
touchscreen, and hand counting-are subject to errors, procedural lapses, and deliberate …