Turnitin
降AI改写
早检测系统
早降重系统
Turnitin-UK版
万方检测-期刊版
维普编辑部版
Grammarly检测
Paperpass检测
checkpass检测
PaperYY检测
The steep cost of capture
M Whittaker - Interactions, 2021 - dl.acm.org
FEATURE position. This threatens to deprive frontline communities, policymakers, and the
public of vital knowledge about the costs and consequences of AI and the industry …
public of vital knowledge about the costs and consequences of AI and the industry …
Ballot-marking devices cannot ensure the will of the voters
The complexity of US elections usually requires computers to count ballots—but computers
can be hacked, so election integrity requires a voting system in which paper ballots can be …
can be hacked, so election integrity requires a voting system in which paper ballots can be …
Sets of half-average nulls generate risk-limiting audits: SHANGRLA
PB Stark - Financial Cryptography and Data Security: FC 2020 …, 2020 - Springer
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced to testing sets of
null hypotheses of the form “the average of this list is not greater than 1/2” for a collection of …
null hypotheses of the form “the average of this list is not greater than 1/2” for a collection of …
E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online Voting
Online voting is attractive for convenience and accessibility, but is more susceptible to voter
coercion and vote buying than in-person voting. One mitigation is to give voters fake voting …
coercion and vote buying than in-person voting. One mitigation is to give voters fake voting …
" Why wouldn't someone think of democracy as a target?": Security practices & challenges of people involved with {US}. political campaigns
People who are involved with political campaigns face increased digital security threats from
well-funded, sophisticated attackers, especially nation-states. Improving political campaign …
well-funded, sophisticated attackers, especially nation-states. Improving political campaign …
Voter verification of ballot marking device ballots is a two-part question: Can they? Mostly, they can. Do they? Mostly, they don't
The question of whether or not voters actually verify ballots produced by ballot marking
devices (BMDs) is presently the subject of some controversy. Recent studies (eg, Bernhard …
devices (BMDs) is presently the subject of some controversy. Recent studies (eg, Bernhard …
Security analysis of the democracy live online voting system
Democracy Live's OmniBallot platform is a web-based system for blank ballot delivery, ballot
marking, and online voting. Three states—Delaware, West Virginia, and New Jersey …
marking, and online voting. Three states—Delaware, West Virginia, and New Jersey …
Verifiable and Private Vote-by-Mail
Vote-by-mail is increasingly used in Europe and worldwide for government elections.
Nevertheless, very few attempts have been made towards the design of verifiable vote-by …
Nevertheless, very few attempts have been made towards the design of verifiable vote-by …
Investigating voter perceptions of printed physical audit trails for online voting
Online elections come with security challenges since digital votes do not produce physical
audit trails that are easily verifiable. We present and investigate a hybrid online voting …
audit trails that are easily verifiable. We present and investigate a hybrid online voting …
Evidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trial, Then Audit
There is no perfect, infallible way to count votes. All methods including optical scan,
touchscreen, and hand counting-are subject to errors, procedural lapses, and deliberate …
touchscreen, and hand counting-are subject to errors, procedural lapses, and deliberate …