We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in
which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the heart …

We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the
principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome …

Inspired by applications in pricing and contract design, we study the maximization of one-
sided Lipschitz functions, which only provide the (weaker) guarantee that they do not grow …

We study the combinatorial contracting problem of Dütting et al.[13], in which a principal
seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary …

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an
outcome-dependent payment scheme (called contract) so as to incentivize the agent to take …

Contract design involves a principal who establishes contractual agreements about
payments for outcomes that arise from the actions of an agent. In this paper, we initiate the …

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design,
paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper …

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart
of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the …

We provide a justification for the prevalence of linear (commission-based) contracts in
practice under the Bayesian framework. We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model …

We study two combinatorial contract design models--multi-agent and multi-action--where a
principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal …