Multiwinner voting: A new challenge for social choice theory
There are many reasons why societies run elections. For example, a given society may need
to select its leader (eg, a president), members of a team may need to find an appropriate …
to select its leader (eg, a president), members of a team may need to find an appropriate …
Structured preferences
In a typical social choice scenario, agents rank the available alternatives and have to
collectively decide on the best alternative, or a ranking of the alternatives. If there are just …
collectively decide on the best alternative, or a ranking of the alternatives. If there are just …
Proportional participatory budgeting with additive utilities
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively
decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to …
decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to …
Properties of multiwinner voting rules
A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a map** that takes a collection of
strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets …
strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets …
Fairness-aware group recommendation with pareto-efficiency
Group recommendation has attracted significant research efforts for its importance in
benefiting a group of users. This paper investigates the Group Recommendation problem …
benefiting a group of users. This paper investigates the Group Recommendation problem …
Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
We consider approval-based committee voting, ie the setting where each voter approves a
subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners …
subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners …
Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting
Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating
individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most …
individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most …
Almost-polynomial ratio ETH-hardness of approximating densest k-subgraph
P Manurangsi - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
In the Densest k-Subgraph (D k S) problem, given an undirected graph G and an integer k,
the goal is to find a subgraph of G on k vertices that contains maximum number of edges …
the goal is to find a subgraph of G on k vertices that contains maximum number of edges …
Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
[PDF][PDF] Computational aspects of multi-winner approval voting
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to
elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval …
elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval …