Strategyproof social choice

S Barberà - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2011 - Elsevier
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Endogenous political institutions

P Aghion, A Alesina, F Trebbi - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2004 - academic.oup.com
A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate
unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs …

[BOOK][B] Art, emotion and ethics

B Gaut - 2007 - books.google.com
Art, Emotion and Ethics is a systematic investigation of the relation of art to morality, a topic
that has been of central and recurring interest to the philosophy of art since Plato. Berys …

[BOOK][B] The Oxford handbook of political economy

BR Weingast, D Wittman - 2008 - books.google.com
Over its long lifetime," political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of
managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; …

Dynamics and stability of constitutions, coalitions, and clubs

D Acemoglu, G Egorov, K Sonin - American Economic Review, 2012 - aeaweb.org
In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of
political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this …

Choosing how to choose: Self-stable majority rules and constitutions

S Barbera, MO Jackson - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004 - academic.oup.com
Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect
leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback …

Political Social Learning: Short-Term Memory and Cycles of Polarization

G Levy, R Razin - American Economic Review, 2025 - pubs.aeaweb.org
This paper investigates the effect of voters' short-term memory on political outcomes by
considering politics as a collective learning process. We find that short-term memory may …

Political selection and persistence of bad governments

D Acemoglu, G Egorov, K Sonin - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2010 - academic.oup.com
We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a
special focus on institutional “flexibility.” A government consists of a subset of the individuals …

On the political economy of urban growth: Homeownership versus affordability

F Ortalo-Magné, A Prat - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014 - aeaweb.org
We study the equilibrium properties of an overlap**-generation economy where agents
choose where to locate and how much housing to own, and city residents vote on the …

Self-enforcing voting in international organizations

G Maggi, M Morelli - American Economic Review, 2006 - aeaweb.org
Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or
qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by …