This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Abstract In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism
midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked …

We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings
of incomplete information, and address this problem using" recommender mechanisms." A …

In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax
dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating …

International migration is maybe the single most effective way to alleviate global poverty.
When a given host country allows more immigrants in, this creates costs and benefits for that …

We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …

The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by
participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design …

School districts in the United States and around the world are increasingly moving away
from traditional neighborhood school assignment, in which pupils attend closest schools to …

We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible
objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money …

The problem of allocating bundles of indivisible objects without transfers arises in many
practical settings, including the assignment of courses to students, of siblings to schools, and …