Although information design has recently received significant attention as a tool for sha**
consumers' purchase behavior, little is known about its use and implications in two-sided …

We study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two
strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The …

Today navigation applications (eg, Waze and Google Maps) enable human users to learn
and share the latest traffic observations, yet such information sharing simply aids selfish …

In this article, we have proposed a model-free reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm, based
on sequential decomposition, to obtain optimal policies for mean field games (MFGs). We …

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stack-elberg mean field game with a leader and
an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately …

In this paper, we study platforms where resources and jobs are spatially distributed, and
resources have the flexibility to strategically move to different locations for better payoffs. The …

Online platforms collect rich information about participants and then share some of this
information back with them to improve market outcomes. In this paper we study the following …

We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic
and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the sender tries to persuade the
receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering …

We study an information design problem to reduce congestion in transportation networks. In
presence of an uncertain network state, the central planner may sends private signals to the …