Alongside theoretical research, experimental studies lie in the very heart of computational
social choice [9]. The computational aspects of elections, such as the problems of winner …

We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the R-Multi-Bribery
problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate is …

We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near
stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classical definition of stability by …

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which
constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural …

We investigate the possibility of strategic voting in approval-based multiwinner rules. In
particular, we define three axiomatic properties that guarantee resilience to certain forms of …

We study the (parameterized) complexity of Shift Bribery for multiwinner voting rules. We
focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate …

We investigate how robust the results of committee elections are with respect to small
changes in the input preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for …

We introduce the ELECTION ISOMORPHISM problem and a family of its approximate
variants, which we refer to as dISOMORPHISM DISTANCE (d-ID) problems (where d is a …

We study one-sided matching problems where $ n $ agents have preferences over $ m $
objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such …

In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better
administration, eg, electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students …