This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only
its own contribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with …

Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a
bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of …

This is a survey of the literature of (approximately) the last 10 years on the axiomatic
approach to conflict resolution formulated by Nash (Econometrica 28: 155–162, 1950). It …

In the Nash demand game (NDG) n players announce utility demands, the demands are
implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets anything. If the utilities set …

We introduce a new solution concept for n-person strategic games—very weak dominance—
which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of …

I consider the Nash demand game (Nash 1953) in the context of resource-allocation
problems. When the resource is one-dimensional, perturbing the game either pins down the …

We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous smoothing demand
in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the symmetric Nash bargaining …

We characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria for the bargaining game in which two players
simultaneously bid for a share of a pie and receive shares proportional to their bids, or zero …

In games of incomplete information individual players make decisions facing a combination
of structural uncertainty about the underlying parameters of the environment, and strategic …