Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions

AE Roth - international Journal of game Theory, 2008 - Springer
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a
profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching …

Quantum collective learning and many-to-many matching game in the metaverse for connected and autonomous vehicles

Y Ren, R **e, FR Yu, T Huang… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2022 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The accuracy of artificial intelligence (AI) models is crucial for connected and autonomous
vehicles (CAVs). However, in reality, model training under less frequent weather faces the …

Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets

F Kojima, PA Pathak - American Economic Review, 2009 - aeaweb.org
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one
matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets …

Matching mechanisms for refugee resettlement

D Delacrétaz, SD Kominers… - American Economic …, 2023 - aeaweb.org
Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor
the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with …

Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

M Sotomayor - Mathematical social sciences, 1999 - Elsevier
We propose a general definition of stability, setwise-stability, and show that it is a stronger
requirement than pairwise-stability and core. We also show that the core and the set of …

[PDF][PDF] Refugee resettlement

D Delacrétaz, SD Kominers, A Teytelboym - University of Oxford …, 2016 - t8el.com
Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting countries
every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries are ad hoc …

Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints

Y Kamada, F Kojima - Journal of Economic theory, 2017 - Elsevier
Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. To guide market
designers faced with constraints, we propose new stability concepts. A matching is strongly …

Fair matching under constraints: Theory and applications

Y Kamada, F Kojima - Review of Economic Studies, 2024 - academic.oup.com
This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable
matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair …

Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

Y Blum, AE Roth, UG Rothblum - Journal of Economic theory, 1997 - Elsevier
In contrast to entry-level professional labor markets, in which cohorts of candidates and
positions become available at the same time (eg, when candidates graduate from school) …

Von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two‐sided matching

A Mauleon, VJ Vannetelbosch… - Theoretical …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We adopt the notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to
determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one‐to‐one …