Estimating equilibrium in health insurance exchanges: Price competition and subsidy design under the aca
P Tebaldi - Review of Economic Studies, 2025 - academic.oup.com
Regulations to design private yet publicly sponsored health insurance markets are
increasingly adopted in many OECD countries. Here I combine data and economic theory to …
increasingly adopted in many OECD countries. Here I combine data and economic theory to …
Nonparametric estimates of demand in the california health insurance exchange
We develop a new nonparametric approach for discrete choice and use it to analyze the
demand for health insurance in the California Affordable Care Act marketplace. The model …
demand for health insurance in the California Affordable Care Act marketplace. The model …
Demand for health insurance: Evidence from the California and Washington ACA exchanges
E Saltzman - Journal of Health Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
I estimate demand for health insurance using consumer-level data from the California and
Washington ACA exchanges. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies …
Washington ACA exchanges. I use the demand estimates to simulate the impact of policies …
Sources of inertia in the individual health insurance market
Consumers in private health insurance markets are highly inertial. The literature has
repeatedly found consumers are willing to pay thousands of dollars to keep their health plan …
repeatedly found consumers are willing to pay thousands of dollars to keep their health plan …
Inertia, market power, and adverse selection in health insurance: Evidence from the ACA exchanges
We study how inertia interacts with market power and adverse selection in managed
competition health insurance markets. We use consumer-level data to estimate a model of …
competition health insurance markets. We use consumer-level data to estimate a model of …
Subsidy targeting with market power
M Polyakova, SP Ryan - 2019 - nber.org
Public programs frequently use observable characteristics of recipients, such as income, to
target benefits. We show theoretically that when the provision of the subsidized good is …
target benefits. We show theoretically that when the provision of the subsidized good is …
What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California
C Drake - Journal of Health Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
Abstract Health Insurance Marketplaces have received considerable attention for their
narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth …
narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth …
Cost-effectiveness threshold for Healthcare: justification and Quantification
Every public health expenditure, including the one that saves lives or extends life
expectancy of particular persons (target population), bears a cost. Although cost …
expectancy of particular persons (target population), bears a cost. Although cost …
Market design in regulated health insurance markets: Risk adjustment vs. subsidies
Health insurance is increasingly provided through managed competition, in which subsidies
for consumers and risk adjustment for insurers are key market design instruments. We …
for consumers and risk adjustment for insurers are key market design instruments. We …
Individual market health plan affordability after cost‐sharing reduction subsidy cuts
Objective To investigate how changes in insurer participation and composition as well as
state policies affect health plan affordability for individual market enrollees. Data Sources …
state policies affect health plan affordability for individual market enrollees. Data Sources …