[BOOK][B] Consciousness revisited: Materialism without phenomenal concepts

M Tye - 2011 - books.google.com
Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting
the phenomenal concept strategy. We are material beings in a material world, but we are …

[BOOK][B] What the body commands: The imperative theory of pain

C Klein - 2015 - books.google.com
A novel theory of pain, according to which pains are imperatives—commands issued by the
body, ordering you to protect the injured part. In What the Body Commands, Colin Klein …

Valence and value

P Carruthers - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions,
moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion. This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest …

Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of pain

B Cutter, M Tye - Philosophical Issues, 2011 - JSTOR
When you look at the red mug on the desk in front of you, you have an experience with a
distinctive phenomenal character. In virtue of what does your experience have this …

Imperative content and the painfulness of pain

M Martínez - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2011 - Springer
Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for
pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its …

Consciousness revisited

M Tye - Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009a..''A New Look at the …, 2009 - direct.mit.edu
''Living in a material world, and I am a material girl.''So sang Madonna. She was right. We do
live in a material world, and she is a material girl. We are all material beings. But we are also …

Are emotions perceptions of value?

J Dokic, S Lemaire - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2013 - cambridge.org
A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this
idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely …

The intentional structure of moods

U Kriegel - Philosophers, 2019 - philpapers.org
Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena
are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers …

Evaluativist accounts of pain's unpleasantness

D Bain - The Routledge handbook of philosophy of pain, 2017 - taylorfrancis.com
Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for
pain's unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast …

Is feeling pain the perception of something?

M Aydede - The Journal of Philosophy, 2009 - JSTOR
ccording to the increasingly popular perceptual/representatio accounts of pain (and other
bodily sensations such as itch JL JL tickles, orgasms, and so on), feeling pain in a body reg …