What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

R Aue, T Klein, J Ortega - ZEW-Centre for European Economic …, 2020 - papers.ssrn.com
We study the welfare effects of school district consolidation, ie the integration of disjoint
school districts into a centralised clearinghouse. We show theoretically that, in the worst …

[HTML][HTML] School choice with independent versus consolidated districts

T Klein, R Aue, J Ortega - Games and Economic Behavior, 2024 - Elsevier
This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-
ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system, we …

Stable and extremely unequal

A Galichon, O Ghelfi, M Henry - Economics Letters, 2023 - Elsevier
We show how stability as a solution concept in matching often comes at the cost of extreme
forms on inequality. Restricting our attention to aligned preferences, we show that the stable …

Stable matching as transportation

F Echenique, J Root, F Sandomirskiy - arxiv preprint arxiv:2402.13378, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study matching markets with aligned preferences and establish a connection between
common design objectives--stability, efficiency, and fairness--and the theory of optimal …

[PDF][PDF] Evaluating priority rules in school choice

JF Escobar, M Valdevenito - 2024 - dii.uchile.cl
In many school choice programs, students are centrally assigned to schools using the
deferred acceptance algorithm. The priority rule employed by schools–such as proximity …

[PDF][PDF] Performance bounds for stable matchings

JF Escobar, M Valdevenito - 2024 - dii.uchile.cl
A common method to allocate scarce resources is to apply the deferred acceptance
algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) and obtain a stable matching. However, a …