Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance

J Newton - Games, 2018 - mdpi.com
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

Preferences for truth‐telling

J Abeler, D Nosenzo, C Raymond - Econometrica, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists
have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes …

Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation

EA Smith - Evolution and human behavior, 2010 - Elsevier
All social species face various “collective action problems”(CAPs) or “social dilemmas,”
meaning problems in achieving cooperating when the best move from a selfish point of view …

Strategic communication with lying costs

N Kartik - The Review of Economic Studies, 2009 - academic.oup.com
I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an
informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of …

Giving and receiving advice

J Sobel - Advances in economics and econometrics, 2013 - books.google.com
Models of signaling, adverse selection, and moral hazard make it clear that differences in
information can lead to inefficiency. Workers may invest in nonproductive education to …

Evolution and Kantian morality

I Alger, JW Weibull - Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of
evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups …

Improving coordination in small-scale multi-agent deep reinforcement learning through memory-driven communication

E Pesce, G Montana - Machine Learning, 2020 - Springer
Deep reinforcement learning algorithms have recently been used to train multiple interacting
agents in a centralised manner whilst kee** their execution decentralised. When the …

Social norms and economic incentives in firms

S Huck, D Kübler, J Weibull - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012 - Elsevier
This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We
introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' …

When does communication improve coordination?

T Ellingsen, R Östling - American Economic Review, 2010 - aeaweb.org
We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players.
Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize …

Participation

G Charness, M Dufwenberg - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social
outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents …