This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to
theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to …

International environmental agreements are increasingly important in a globalised economy.
Beyond their specific interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition …

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical
analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings …

In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, firms have an opportunity to form pair-wise
collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment of resources …

We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm
collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights …

We study informal insurance within communities, explicitly recognizing the possibility that
subgroups of individuals may destabilize insurance arrangements among the larger group …

We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as
coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an …

In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers
play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the …

If all countries participate in a climate agreement, policies affecting the supply of fossil fuels
have identical economic consequences as policies affecting the demand of fossil fuels. This …