Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more efficient resource allocation but
not for profit. We consider redistribution mechanism design in a setting where participants …

We study worst-case VCG redistribution mechanism design for the public project problem.
The mechanism design task comes down to designing a payment function that maximizes …

We study mechanism design for nonexcludable and excludable binary public project
problems. Our aim is to maximize the expected number of consumers and the expected …

For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG …

We study the classic public project problem, where the agents decide whether or not to build
a non-excludable public project. We focus on efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly budget …

The VCG mechanism has many nice properties, and can be applied to a wide range of
social decision problems. One problem of the VCG mechanism is that even though it is …

Abstract Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design (CFAMD) combines
manual mechanism design and optimization. In CFAMD, we focus on a parameterized family …

Many important problems in multiagent systems involve resource allocations. Self-interested
agents may lie about their valuations if doing so increases their own utilities. Therefore, it is …

Mechanism design is a central research branch in microeconomics. An effective mechanism
can significantly improve performance and efficiency of social decisions under desired …

We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social
outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the …