We show that fine-grained and coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC)
systems are equally expressive. To this end, we mechanize two mostly standard languages …

We present an expressive information-flow control type system with recursive types,
existential types, label polymorphism, and impredicative type polymorphism for a higher …

Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms such as
privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several …

To enforce non-interference, both Secure Multi-Execution (SME) and Multiple Facets (MF)
rely on the introduction of multi-executions. The attractiveness of these techniques is that …

In this paper we revisit the connection between parametricity and noninterference. Our
primary contribution is a proof of noninterference for a polyvariant variation of the …

Noninterference is the strong information-security property that a program does not leak
secrets through publicly-visible behavior. In the presence of effects such as nontermination …

We present Lifty, a domain-specific language for data-centric applications that manipulate
sensitive data. A Lifty programmer annotates the sources of sensitive data with declarative …

Recent research in privacy-preserving systems relies on state-of-the-art defenses to close
the termination timing channel. In this paper, we challenge the effectiveness of the adopted …

Language-Based Information Flow Control (IFC) provides strong security guarantees for
untrusted code, but often suffers from a non-negligible rate of false alarms. Multi-execution …

Type systems designed for information-flow control commonly use a program-counter label
to track the sensitivity of the context and rule out data leakage arising from effectful …