Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender segregation in labor
markets. We examine the allocation of a task that everyone prefers be completed by …

We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In
one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a …

Things afford positive, neutral, or negative long-run effects on the replicative probability of
the focal individual's genes. At the most general level, values are internal estimates of those …

We study social dilemmas in (quasi‐) continuous‐time experiments, comparing games with
different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior …

This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment
dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large …

The theory of continuous time games (Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Bergin and MacLeod
(1993)) shows that continuous time interactions can generate very different equilibrium …

Standard one-and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a
uniparametric family combining intra-and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates …

Why are some behaviors governed by strong social conventions while others are not? We
experimentally investigate two factors contributing to the formation of conventions in a game …

We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-) continuous
time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The …