When aggregating the preferences of multiple agents into one collective choice, it is easily
seen that certain cases call for randomization or other means of tiebreaking. For example, if …

The Four Color Theorem is a famous early example of a mathematical result that was proven
with the help of computers. Recent advances in artificial intelligence, particularly in …

We determine the quality of randomized social choice algorithms in a setting in which the
agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs …

Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable
electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context …

Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only
social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also …

One of the most innovative aspects of blockchain technology consists in the introduction of
an incentive layer to regulate the behavior of distributed protocols. The designer of a …

Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that
the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be …

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for
studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a …

Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …