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Revenue submodularity
We introduce revenue submodularity, the property that market expansion has diminishing
returns on an auction's expected revenue. We prove that revenue submodularity is generally …
returns on an auction's expected revenue. We prove that revenue submodularity is generally …
Approximation and convergence of large atomic congestion games
We consider the question of whether and in what sense, Wardrop equilibria provide a good
approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large …
approximation for Nash equilibria in atomic unsplittable congestion games with a large …
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
We present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion-resistant
mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can …
mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can …
Revenue submodularity
We introduce revenue submodularity, the property that market expansion has diminishing
returns on an auction's expected revenue. We prove that revenue submodularity is generally …
returns on an auction's expected revenue. We prove that revenue submodularity is generally …
[PDF][PDF] Is efficiency expensive
We study the simultaneous optimization of efficiency and revenue in pay-per-click keyword
auctions in a Bayesian setting. Our main result is that the efficient keyword auction yields …
auctions in a Bayesian setting. Our main result is that the efficient keyword auction yields …
[HTML][HTML] Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
We study mechanism design for social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with
general bidders given by demand oracles. It is a major open problem in this setting to design …
general bidders given by demand oracles. It is a major open problem in this setting to design …
[HTML][HTML] Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
We study the question of whether optimization problems can be solved exactly in the
presence of economic constraints, such as truthfulness of selfish agents. In general …
presence of economic constraints, such as truthfulness of selfish agents. In general …
A linear in-situ algorithm for the power of cyclic permutation
J Xue, B Yang, Z Zuo - … Second Annual International Workshop, FAW 2008 …, 2008 - Springer
We present and develop a linear in-situ algorithm for the power of a cyclic permutation P r (-
n< r< n). Several related algorithms become the special cases of this algorithm. At first, we …
n< r< n). Several related algorithms become the special cases of this algorithm. At first, we …
Multi-bidding strategy in sponsored search auctions
The generalized second price auction has recently become a much studied model for
sponsored search auctions for Internet advertisement. Though it is known not to be incentive …
sponsored search auctions for Internet advertisement. Though it is known not to be incentive …
A robust learning approach to repeated auctions with monitoring and entry fees
In this paper, we present a strategic bidding framework for repeated auctions with monitoring
and entry fees. We motivate and formally define the desired properties of our framework and …
and entry fees. We motivate and formally define the desired properties of our framework and …