[BOOK][B] Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory

T Roughgarden - 2016 - books.google.com
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen
years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central …

Approximate mechanism design without money

AD Procaccia, M Tennenholtz - ACM Transactions on Economics and …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Artificial intelligence for social good: A survey

ZR Shi, C Wang, F Fang - arxiv preprint arxiv:2001.01818, 2020 - arxiv.org
Artificial intelligence for social good (AI4SG) is a research theme that aims to use and
advance artificial intelligence to address societal issues and improve the well-being of the …

Failure-aware kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the fourteenth …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

Position-indexed formulations for kidney exchange

JP Dickerson, DF Manlove, B Plaut… - Proceedings of the …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …

Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange

I Ashlagi, AE Roth - Theoretical Economics, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
As multi‐hospital kidney exchange has grown, the set of players has grown from patients
and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals can choose to enroll only their hard‐to‐match …

A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program

M Carvalho, A Lodi - European Journal of Operational Research, 2023 - Elsevier
A main aim of kidney exchange programs (KEPs) is to maximize the number of transplants
within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP involving …

Strategyproofing peer assessment via partitioning: The price in terms of evaluators' expertise

K Dhull, S Jecmen, P Kothari, NB Shah - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2022 - ojs.aaai.org
Strategic behavior is a fundamental problem in a variety of real-world applications that
require some form of peer assessment, such as peer grading of homeworks, grant proposal …

[PDF][PDF] Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: Theory and reality

JP Dickerson, AD Procaccia, T Sandholm - Proceedings of the 11th …, 2012 - cs.cmu.edu
Kidney exchange, where needy patients swap incompatible donors with each other, offers a
lifesaving alternative to waiting for an organ from the deceased-donor waiting list. Recently …

Fairness models for multi-agent kidney exchange programmes

X Klimentova, A Viana, JP Pedroso, N Santos - Omega, 2021 - Elsevier
Nowadays there are several countries running independent kidney exchange programmes
(KEPs). These programmes allow a patient with kidney failure, having a willing healthy but …