The first question faced in writing this survey is how to organize it and what to include. There
have been hundreds of papers reporting experimental work on auctions since the 1995 …

We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder
valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995–1996 C block auction. We …

Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research* John H. Kagel and Dan Levin Department of
Economics The Ohio State University 410 Page 1 Auctions: A Survey of Experimental …

We survey experimental research on multiunit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may
be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists …

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi‐unit auction mechanisms. Two units
of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two …

The danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers. In this paper, we
compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions, the English auction and the first …

We investigate the role of timing in ascending auctions under the premise that time is a
valuable resource. Traditional models of the English auction ignore timing issues by …

We introduce a two‐player, binary‐choice game in which both players have a privately
known incentive to enter, yet the combined surplus is highest if only one enters. Repetition of …

The response of prices and mark-ups to economic shocks plays a crucial role in sha**
how the economy adjusts. We explore the role that market concentration plays in …

We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple
objects in independent private values environments: simultaneous and sequential …